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Although the threat of rare economic disasters can have large effect on asset prices, difficulty in inference
regarding both their likelihood and severity provides the potential for disagreements among investors.
Such disagreements lead investors to insure each other against the types of disasters each one fears
the most. Due to the highly nonlinear relationship between consumption losses in a disaster and the
risk premium, a small amount of risk sharing can significantly attenuate the effect that disaster risk
has on the equity premium. We characterize the sensitivity of risk premium to wealth distribution analytically.
Our model shows that time variation in the wealth distribution and the amount of disagreement across
agents can both lead to significant variation in disaster risk premium. It also highlights the conditions
under which disaster risk premium will be large, namely when disagreement across agents is small
or when the wealth distribution is highly concentrated in agents fearful of disasters. Finally, the model
predicts an inverse U-shaped relationship between the equity premium and the size of the disaster
insurance market.
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How likely is it that a severe economic disaster will occur in the next 100 years? With
a relatively short sample of historical data, it is diﬃcult to accurately estimate the
likelihood of disasters or the size of their impact. For example, one cannot reject a
constant disaster intensity of 3% at the 5% signiﬁcance level even after observing 100
years without a disaster. This suggests that there is likely to be signiﬁcant hetero-
geneity in the beliefs of market participants about disasters. In this paper, we show
that such disagreements can generate strong risk sharing motives among investors and
signiﬁcantly aﬀect asset prices.
We study an exchange economy with two types of agents. Markets are complete, so
that the agents can trade contingent claims and achieve optimal risk sharing. Through
the aﬃne heterogeneous beliefs framework, our model can capture very general forms
of disagreements among the agents while maintaining the tractability. For example,
the agents can disagree about the intensity of disasters or the severity of disasters, and
the amount of disagreements can ﬂuctuate over time.
One of our main ﬁndings is that having a second type of agents with diﬀerent
beliefs about disasters can cause the equity premium to drop substantially, even when
the new agents only have a small amount of wealth. This result holds whether the
disagreement is about the intensity or impact of disasters. In fact, the result can still
be true even when the new agents are generally more pessimistic about disasters. We
analytically characterize the sensitivity of risk premium to the wealth distribution and
derive its limit as the amount of disagreement increases. When we calibrate the beliefs
of one agent using international data (from Barro (2006)) and the other using only
consumption data from the US (where disasters have been relatively mild), raising
the fraction of total wealth for the second agent from 0 to 10% lowers the equity
premium from 4.4% to 2.0%. The decline in the equity premium becomes faster when
the disagreement is larger, or when the new agents also have lower risk aversion.
1There are two key reasons behind this result: (1) the equity premium is highly
sensitive to changes in the size of individual consumption losses during a disaster; (2)
the equity premium derives almost entirely from jump (disaster) risk, which implies
high prices for jump risk and induces aggressive risk sharing.
First, there is a highly nonlinear relationship between risk premium and disaster risk
exposure. For example, if an agent (with γ = 4) manages to reduce her consumption
loss in a disaster from 40% to 35%, the equity premium she demands will fall by
40%! This non-linearity is an intrinsic property of disaster models, which generate
high premium from rare events by making marginal utility in the disaster states rise
substantially with the size of the consumption losses. As a result, a small reduction
in the individual disaster risk exposure due to risk sharing can signiﬁcantly lower the
premium.
Second, in our economy, as is typical in standard power utility models, there is very
little compensation for Brownian risk due to the low volatility of consumption and
moderate levels of risk aversion. Consequently, the equity premium derives primarily
from disaster risk, and the compensation for bearing disaster risk must be high. For
example, if the equity premium due to disaster risk is 4%, and there is a single type of
disaster resulting in a 40% loss to the market, then the annual premium for a disaster
insurance contract that pays $1 when disaster strikes must cost 10 cents or more,
regardless of the actual chance of payoﬀ.
Such a high premium for disaster risk provides strong motivation for risk sharing
when agents have diﬀerent beliefs about disasters. In a benchmark example of our
model, the pessimists are willing to pay up to 13 cents per $1 of disaster insurance
coverage, even though the payoﬀ probability is only 1.7% under their own beliefs.
The optimists, who believe the payoﬀ probability is just 0.1%, underwrite insurance
contracts with notional value up to 40% of their total wealth, despite the risk of losing
70% of their consumption if a disaster strikes.
Taken together, when we allocate a small amount of wealth to agents with hetero-
2geneous beliefs, the risk sharing they provide will be enough to signiﬁcantly reduce the
equity premium in equilibrium. Importantly, the above mechanism does not require
the new agents to be “globally” more optimistic about disasters than the existing ones.
What is critical to the risk sharing mechanism is that the minority wealth holders
believe that the types of disasters the majority wealth holders fear most are relatively
unlikely. Although these minority wealth holders may fear other disasters (perhaps
even larger and/or more frequent ones), they will still be willing to share the disaster
risk that the majority wealth holders fear. Thus, heterogeneity among agents may
result in a low equity premium even if each would individually demand a high equity
premium when other types of agents are not present.
The model not only demonstrates the sensitivity of disaster risk premium to hetero-
geneous beliefs, but also highlights the conditions under which disaster risk premium
will be large, namely when disagreement across agents is small, or when the wealth
distribution is highly concentrated in those agents with similar fears of disasters. When
the wealth distribution across agents with diﬀerent beliefs is not too concentrated, the
disaster risk premium will remain low and smooth as the average belief of disaster
risk in the market ﬂuctuates. However, when a disaster strikes, those optimists will
lose a large fraction of their wealth and their risk sharing capacity will be greatly re-
duced. As a result, the disaster risk premium will jump up signiﬁcantly, and become
more sensitive to ﬂuctuations in disaster risk going forward. Similarly, the amount
of disagreement across agents also has important eﬀects on disaster risk. If agents’
beliefs converge when disaster risk rises, that could amplify the rise of the disaster risk
premium. However, if beliefs diverge, the disaster risk premium can actually become
lower just as the average perceived disaster risk rises.
A number of other interesting results and predictions arises from our analysis. We
show that agents who are overly optimistic about disasters are likely to survive and
even gain wealth for long periods of time. This is quite diﬀerent from the case of
disagreement about mean growth rates, where agents with wrong beliefs are likely to
3lose the majority of their wealth quickly. Also, similar to the link between asset prices
and the size of the market for riskless lending in Longstaﬀ and Wang (2008), our model
predicts an inverse U-shaped relationship between the equity premium and the size of
the disaster insurance market.
This paper builds on the disaster risk model of Rietz (1988), Longstaﬀ and Pi-
azzesi (2004), and Barro (2006). Barro has reinvigorated this literature by providing
international evidence that disasters have been frequent and severe enough to generate
a large equity premium.1 The majority of these studies adopt a representative-agent
framework. The two papers closest to ours are Bates (2008) and Dieckmann (2009).
Bates (2008) studies investors with heterogenous attitudes towards crash risk, which is
isomorphic to heterogeneous beliefs of disaster risk. He focuses on small but frequent
crashes and does not model intermediate consumption. Dieckmann considers only log
utility. In these settings, risk sharing has limited eﬀects on the equity premium. In
addition, our model also captures more general disagreements about disasters, time-
varying disaster intensities, and time-varying disagreement.
The paper also contributes to the literature of heterogeneous beliefs and prefer-
ences.2 Our aﬃne heterogeneous beliefs framework makes it tractable to study various
forms of heterogeneity in beliefs about disasters through the generalized transform re-
sults of Chen and Joslin (2009). Our main ﬁnding is related to the results of Kogan,
Ross, Wang, and Westerﬁeld (2006), who show that irrational traders can still have
large price impact when their wealth becomes negligible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 analyzes the eﬀect of risk sharing in a setting with disagreement about disaster
1A series of recent studies include Liu, Pan, and Wang (2005), Weitzman (2007), Barro (2009),
Gabaix (2009), Wachter (2009), Martin (2008), Farhi and Gabaix (2009), Backus, Chernov, and
Martin (2009), and others.
2See Basak (2005) for a survey on heterogeneous beliefs and asset pricing. Recent developments
include Kogan, Ross, Wang, and Westerﬁeld (2006), Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006), Yan (2008), David
(2008), Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), Xiong and Yan (2009), among others. Among the works
on heterogeneous preferences are Dumas (1989), Wang (1996), Chan and Kogan (2002), and more
recently Longstaﬀ and Wang (2008).
4intensity. Section 4 generalizes the forms of disagreements and calibrates two sets of
beliefs using historical data. Section 5 studies the eﬀects of time-varying disagreement.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Model Setup
We consider a continuous-time, pure exchange economy. There are two agents (A,
B), each being the representative of her own class. Agent A believes that the aggre-
gate endowment is Ct = ecc
t+cd
t, where cc




t = ¯ gdt + σcdW
c
t , (1)
where ¯ g and σc are the expected growth rate and volatility of consumption without
jumps, and W c
t is a standard Brownian motion under agent A’s beliefs. The term cd
t
is a pure jump process whose jumps arrive with stochastic intensity λt,
dλt = κ(¯ λ





where ¯ λA is the long-run average jump intensity under A’s beliefs, and W λ
t is a standard
Brownian motion independent of W c
t . The jumps ∆cd
t have time-invariant distribution
νA. We summarize agent A’s beliefs with the probability measure PA.
Agent B believes that the probability measure is PB, which we shall suppose is
equivalent to PA.3 She may disagree about the growth rate of consumption without
jumps, the likelihood of disasters or the distribution of the severity of disasters when
they occur. We assume that the two agents are aware of each others’ beliefs, but
nonetheless “agree to disagree”.4
3More precisely, PA and PB are equivalent when restricted to any σ-ﬁeld FT = σ({cc
t,cd
t,λt}0≤t≤T).
4We do not explicitly model learning about disasters. Given the nature of disasters, Bayesian
updating of beliefs about disaster risk using realized consumption growth will likely be very slow, and
5Speciﬁcally, as in Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2010), agent B’s beliefs are characterized
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ds, (4)
for some constants b and ¯ λB > 0, and at is a pure jump process whose jumps are
coincident with the jumps in cd









dνA is a function of the disaster size and reﬂects the disagreement about the
distribution of disaster size (conditional on a disaster). It will be large (small) for the
type of disasters that agent B thinks are relatively more (less) likely than agent A.
Intuitively, ηt expresses the diﬀerences in beliefs between the agents by letting agent
B assign a higher probability to those states where ηt is large. The terms at and bcc
t
reﬂect B’s potential disagreements regarding the likelihood of disasters and the growth
rate of consumption, respectively. It follows from (3-5) that, under agent B’s beliefs, the
expected growth rate of consumption without jumps is ¯ g + bσ2
c, a disaster occurs with
intensity λt×
¯ λB
¯ λA (with long run average intensity ¯ λB), and the disaster size distribution
is νB (which is equivalent to νA). The jumps in ηt speciﬁed in (5) are given by the
log likelihood ratio for disasters of diﬀerent sizes under the two agents’ beliefs. Within
this setup, agent B not only can disagree with A on the average frequency of disasters,
but also the likelihoods for disasters of diﬀerent magnitude. Moreover, this setup also
has the advantage of remaining within the aﬃne family as (cc
t,cd
t,logηt,λt) follows a
jointly aﬃne process, which makes it possible to compute the equilibrium analytically.
We assume that the agents are inﬁnitely lived and have constant relative-risk aver-
the disagreements in the priors will persist for a long time.














, i = A,B. (6)
We also assume that markets are complete and agents are endowed with some ﬁxed
share of aggregate consumption (θA,θB = 1 − θA).
The equilibrium allocations can be characterized as the solution of the following





















subject to the resource constraint CA
t + CB
t = Ct. Here, ˜ ζt ≡ ζηt is the belief-adjusted
Pareto weight for agent B. From the ﬁrst order condition and the resource constraint
we obtain the equilibrium consumption allocations: CA
t = fA(ˆ ζt)Ct and CB
t = (1 −
fA(ˆ ζt))Ct, where ˆ ζt = e(ρA−ρB)tC
γA−γB
t ˜ ζt, and fA is in general an implicit function.
The stochastic discount factor under A’s beliefs, MA













Finally, we can solve for ζ through the life-time budget constraint for one of the agents
(see Cox and Huang (1989)), which is linked to the initial allocation of endowment.
Since our emphasis is on heterogeneous beliefs about disasters, for the remainder of
this section we focus on the case where there is no disagreement about the distribution
of Brownian shocks, and the two agents have the same preferences. In this case, b = 0,














7(5)). Thus, if agent B is more pessimistic about a particular type of disaster, she will
have a higher weight in the planner’s problem when such a disaster occurs, so that her
consumption share increases.
The equilibrium allocations can be implemented through competitive trading in a
sequential-trade economy. Extending the analysis of Bates (2008), we can consider
three types of traded securities: (i) a risk-free money market account, (ii) a claim to
aggregate consumption, and (iii) a series (or continuum) of disaster insurance contracts
with 1 year maturity, which pay $1 on the maturity date if a disaster of size d occurs
within a year.


























where DA denotes the inﬁnitesimal generator under Agent A’s beliefs of Xt = (cc
t,cd
t,λt,ηt)
and we use the short-hand notation E
∆,A

































dτ = Cth(λt, ˜ ζt), (12)
where the price/consumption ratio only depends on the disaster intensity λt and the
stochastic weight ˜ ζt. In the case where λt is constant, the price of the consumption
claim is obtained in closed form. Similarly, we can compute the wealth of the individual
agents as well as the prices of disaster insurance contracts using the stochastic discount
factor (see Appendix A for details).
In order for prices of the aggregate endowment claim to be ﬁnite in the heterogeneous-
agent economy, it is necessary and suﬃcient that prices are ﬁnite under each agent’s
8beliefs in a single-agent economy (see Appendix C for a proof). As we show in the
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where φi is the moment generating function for the distribution of jumps in endow-
ment νi under measure Pi. The ﬁrst inequality reﬂects the fact that the volatility of
the disaster intensity cannot be too large relative to the rate of mean reversion. It
prevents the convexity eﬀect induced by the potentially large intensity from dominat-
ing the discounting. The second inequality reﬂects the need for enough discounting to
counteract the growth.
Additionally, the stochastic discount factor characterizes the unique risk neutral
probability measure Q (see, for example, Duﬃe (2001)), which facilitates the compu-








t is determined by the expected jump size of the stochastic discount fac-
tor at the time of a disaster. When the riskfree rate and disaster intensity are close
to zero, the risk-neutral disaster intensity λ
Q
t has the nice interpretation of (approxi-
mately) the value of a one-year disaster insurance contract that pays $1 at t+ 1 when
a disaster occurs between t and t+1. The risk-neutral distribution of the disaster size
is given by dνQ







t (d) denotes the pricing kernel when
the state is (cc
t,cd




dνA(d)). These risk adjustments are quite intuitive.
The more the stochastic discount factor for agent i jumps up during a disaster, the
large is λ
Q
t relative to λi
t, i.e. disasters occur more frequently under the risk-neutral
measure. Thus, the ratio λ
Q
t /λi
t is often referred to as the jump-risk premium. More-
over, the risk-adjusted distribution of jump size conditional on a disaster slants the
probabilities towards the types of disasters that lead to a bigger jump in the stochastic
discount factor, which generally makes severe disasters more likely under Q.
9Finally, the risk premium for any security under agent i’s beliefs is the diﬀerence
between the expected return under Pi and under the risk-neutral measure Q. In the
case of the aggregate endowment claim, the conditional equity premium, under agent
















t [∆R], i = A,B (14)
where Em
t [∆R] ≡ E
∆,m
t [Pt]/Pt − 1 is the expected return on the endowment claim in
a disaster under measure m.5 The diﬀerence between the last two terms in (14) is the
premium for bearing disaster risk. This premium is large if the jump-risk premium is
large, and/or the expected loss in return in a disaster is large (especially under the
risk-neutral measure).
















This diﬀerence will be small relative to the size of the equity premium when the dis-
aster intensity and expected loss under the risk-neutral measure are large relative to
their values under actual beliefs. In the remainder of the paper, we report the equity
premium relative to agent A’s beliefs, PA. One interpretation for picking PA as the
reference measure is that A has the correct beliefs, and we are studying the impact of
the incorrect beliefs of agent B on asset prices.
3 Heterogeneous Beliefs and Risk Sharing
We start with a special case of the model where agents only disagree about the fre-
quency of disasters. First, we analyze the impact of heterogeneous beliefs and its
5To be concrete, we deﬁne the risk premium under measure i for any price process P(Xt,t) which
pays dividends D(Xt,t) to be DiP/P − (rt + Dt).















































Figure 1: Disagreement about the frequency of disasters. Panel A plots the
equity premium under the pessimist’s beliefs as a function of the wealth share of the
optimist. Panel B plots the jump-risk premium λ
Q
t /λA for the pessimist.
implications for survival when the risk of disasters is constant, i.e., λt = ¯ λA (denoted
as λA for simplicity). We then extend the analysis to the case with time-varying disaster
risk.
3.1 Disagreement about the Frequency of Disasters
In the simplest version of our model, the disaster size is deterministic, ∆cd
t = ¯ d, and
the two agents only disagree about the frequency of disasters (λ). We set ¯ d = −0.51
so that the moment generating function (MGF) φA(−γ) in this model matches the
calibration of Barro (2006) for γ = 4. It implies that aggregate consumption falls by
40% when a disaster occurs. Agent A (pessimist) believes that disasters occur with
intensity λA = 1.7% (once every 60 years), which is also taken from Barro (2006).
Agent B (optimist) believes that disasters are much less likely, λB = 0.1% (once every
1000 years), but she agrees with A on the size of disasters as well as the Brownian
risk in consumption. She also has the same preferences as agent A. The remaining
parameters are ¯ g = 2.5%, σc = 2%, and ρ = 3%.
11Figure 1 shows the conditional equity premium and the jump-risk premium under
the pessimist’s beliefs. If all the wealth is owned by the pessimist, the equity premium
is 4.7%, and the riskfree rate is 1.3%. Since the optimist assigns very low probabilities
to disasters, if she has all the wealth, the equity premium is only −0.21% under the
pessimist’s beliefs, which reﬂects the low compensation the optimist requires for bearing
disaster risk and the higher frequency of the pessimist beliefs. Thus, it is not surprising
to see the premium falling when the optimist owns more wealth. However, the speed
at which the premium declines in Panel A is impressive. When the optimistic agent
owns 10% of the total wealth, the equity premium has fallen from 4.7% to 2.7%. When
the wealth of the optimist reaches 20%, the equity premium falls to just 1.7%.
We can derive the conditional equity premium as a special case of (14), where the






















where h is the price-consumption ratio from (12), with λt being constant. The ﬁrst
term γσ2
c is the standard compensation for bearing Brownian risk. Heterogeneity has
no eﬀect on this term since the agents agree about the brownian risk. Given the
value of risk aversion and consumption volatility, this term has negligible eﬀect on
the premium. The second term reﬂects the compensation for disaster risk. It can be
further decomposed into three factors: (i) the constant disaster intensity λA, (ii) the
jump-risk premium λ
Q
t /λA, and (iii) the return of the consumption claim in a disaster.
How does the wealth distribution aﬀect the jump-risk premium? From the deﬁnition
of the stochastic discount factor MA
t and the risk-neutral intensity λ
Q
t , it is easy to show
λ
Q
t /λA = e−γ∆cA
t , where ∆cA
t is the jump size of the equilibrium log consumption for
agent A in a disaster, which could be very diﬀerent from the jump size in aggregate
endowment due to trading. Without trading ∆cA
t = ¯ d, which generates a jump-risk
premium of λ
Q
t /λA = 7.7. Since λ
Q
t is approximately the premium of a one-year disaster
12insurance, before any trading the pessimist will be willing to pay an annual premium of
about 13 cents for $1 of protection against a disaster event that occurs with probability
1.7%.
Since the optimist views disasters as very unlikely events, she is willing to trade away
her claims in the future disaster states in exchange for higher consumption in normal
times. For example, she will ﬁnd selling an $1 disaster insurance and collecting a 13
cents premium a lucrative trade. Such a trade helps reduce the pessimist’s consumption
loss in a disaster ∆cA
t , which in turn lowers the jump-risk premium. However, the
optimist’s capacity for underwriting disaster insurance is limited by her wealth, as she
needs to ensure that her consumption/wealth is positive in all future states, including
when a disaster occurs (no matter how unlikely such an event is). Thus, the more
wealth the optimist has, the more disaster insurance she is able to sell without making
her consumption too risky when a disaster strikes.
The above mechanism can substantially reduce the disaster risk exposure of the
pessimist in equilibrium. Panel B of Figure 1 shows that the jump-risk premium falls
rapidly. When the optimist owns 20% of total wealth, the jump-risk premium drops
from 7.7 to 4.2. According to equation (15), such a drop in the jump-risk premium
alone will cause the equity premium to fall by about half to 2.2%, which accounts for
the majority of the change in the premium (from 4.7% to 1.7%).
Besides the jump-risk premium, the equity premium also depends on the return of
the consumption claim in a disaster, which in turn is determined by the consumption
loss and changes in the price-consumption ratio. Following a disaster, the riskfree rate
drops as the wealth share of the pessimist rises. With CRRA utility, the lower interest
rate eﬀect can dominate that of the rise in the risk premium, leading to a higher price-
consumption ratio.6 Since a higher price-consumption ratio partially oﬀsets the drop
in aggregate consumption, it makes the return less sensitive to disasters, which will
6Wachter (2009) also ﬁnds a positive relation between the price-consumption ratio and the equity
premium in a representative agent rare disaster model with time-varying disaster probabilities and
CRRA utility.
13contribute to the drop in equity premium. However, our decomposition above shows
that the reduction of the jump-risk premium (due to reduced disaster risk exposure)
is the main reason behind the fall in premium.
Can we “counteract” the eﬀect of the optimistic agent and restore the high equity
premium by making the pessimist even more pessimistic about disasters? The dashed
lines in Figure 1 plot the results when agent A believes that the disaster intensity is
2.5% (λA = 2.5%) and everything else equal. The results are striking. While the equity
premium becomes signiﬁcantly higher (6.8%) when the pessimist owns all the wealth, it
falls to 4.1% with just 2% of total wealth allocated to the optimist (already lower than
the previous case with λA = 1.7%), and is below 1% when the wealth of the optimist
exceeds 8.5%. As the wealth share of the optimist grows higher, the premium can
even become negative. The decline in the jump-risk premium is still the main reason
behind the lower equity premium. For example, when the optimist has 10% of total
wealth, the jump-risk premium falls to 4.0, which will drive the premium down to 3.1%
(60% of the total fall). Thus, as the pessimist becomes more pessimistic, she seeks risk
sharing more aggressively, which can quickly reverse the eﬀect of her heightened fear
of disasters.
To better illustrate the risk sharing mechanism between agents, we compute their
portfolio positions in the aggregate consumption claim, disaster insurance, and the
money market account. Calculating these portfolio positions amounts to ﬁnding a
replicating portfolio that matches the exposure to Brownian shocks and jumps in the
individual agents’ wealth processes. Appendix B provides the details. The ﬁrst thing to
notice is that each agent will hold a constant proportion of the consumption claim. This
is because they agree on the brownian risk and share it proportionally. Disagreement
over disaster risk is resolved through trading in the disaster insurance market, which
is ﬁnanced by the money market account.
We ﬁrst plot the notional value of the disaster insurance sold by the optimist as a
fraction of her total wealth in Panel A of Figure 2. The dashed line is the maximum






















































B. Distaster insurance market
 
 














C. Optimist consumption share
 
 

































Figure 2: Risk sharing. Panel A and B plot the total notional value of disaster
insurance relative to the wealth of the optimist and total wealth in the economy. Panel
C plots the consumption share for the optimist in equilibrium. Panel D compares the
two agents’ consumption drops in a disaster with that of the aggregate endowment.
These results are for the case λA = 1.7%.
amount of disaster insurance the optimist can sell (as a fraction of her wealth) subject
to her budget constraint. When the optimist has very little wealth, the notional value
of the disaster insurance she sells is about 35% of her wealth. This value initially
rises and then falls as the optimist gains more wealth. When the optimist has little
wealth, the pessimist has great demand for risk sharing and is willing to pay a higher
premium, which induces the optimist to sell more insurance relative to her wealth. As
the optimist gets more wealth, the premium on the disaster insurance falls, and so does
the relative amount of insurance sold.
We can judge how extreme the risk sharing in equilibrium is by comparing the
actual amount of trading to its limit. At its peak, the amount of disaster insurance
15sold by the optimist is about half of the maximum amount that she can underwrite,
which might appear reasonable. The caveat is that, in reality, underwriters of disaster
insurance will likely be required to collateralize their promises to pay in the disaster
states, which raises the costs of risk sharing.7
Panel B plots the size of the disaster insurance market (the total notional value
normalized by total wealth). Naturally, the size of this market is zero when either agent
has all the wealth, and the market is bigger when wealth is more evenly distributed.
Notice that the model generates a non-monotonic relation between the size of the
disaster insurance market and the equity premium. The premium is high when there
is a lot of demand for disaster insurance but little supply, and is low when the opposite
is true. In either case, the size of the disaster insurance market will be small.
Panel C plots the equilibrium consumption share for the optimist. The 45-degree
line corresponds to the case of no trading. The optimist’s consumption share is above
the 45-degree line, especially when her wealth is small. This is because the optimist is
giving up consumption when disasters occur in order to have more consumption now
(and in the future, provided a disaster has not occurred.) Panel D shows that indeed
the optimist does bear much greater losses in the event of a disaster in order to sustain
higher current consumption. As for the pessimist, the less wealth she possesses, the
more disaster insurance she buys relative to her wealth. This will gradually lower her
disaster risk exposure, and can eventually turn the disaster insurance into a speculative
position — her consumption can jump up in a disaster. Finally, if we make agent A’s
beliefs more pessimistic (e.g. λA = 2.5%), the amount of disaster insurance traded (both
relative to the wealth of the optimistic agent and to total wealth in the economy) will
become higher, while the consumption shares will become more nonlinear. As a result,
the risk premium declines more rapidly with the optimist’s wealth share.
7The collateral constraint can be especially important when agents’ wealth is mostly in the form
of future labor income.
163.2 The Limiting Case for Risk Sharing
In order to highlight the key ingredients of the risk sharing mechanism demonstrated
in the previous section, we now characterize the properties of the equilibrium when
a small fraction of the wealth is controlled by an optimist who believe disasters are
extremely unlikely.8 Consider the eﬀect of a disaster at time t on the marginal utility of
the pessimistic agent (agent A). Before the disaster, suppose that the equilibrium con-
sumption of the optimist agent is a fraction fA
t− of the aggregate endowment Ct−. After
the disaster, the aggregate endowment drops to Ct = e
¯ dCt− but now the pessimistic
agent consumes essentially the entire endowment (i.e. fA
t ≈ 1). This is because the
optimist feels disasters are so unlikely that she is willing to sell all her share of the
endowment in this state to the pessimist. Such a jump in marginal utility is associated


















−γ ¯ d. (16)
For example, when the optimist has only 1% of the endowment to give up in disasters
to the pessimist, this decreases the jump risk premium from e−γ ¯ d to (.99)γe−γ ¯ d, or
approximately a 4% drop when γ = 4.


















−γ ¯ d. (17)
Thus we see that the eﬀect of risk sharing (in terms of consumption share) becomes
stronger (i) when the size of the disaster increases and (ii) when risk aversion increases.9
This only partially reﬂects the steep slope in the risk premium near wB
t = 0 we see
8We thank Xavier Gabaix for suggesting this analysis.
9We take limits since with λB = 0, the beliefs are not equivalent and multiple equilibria are
possible.
17in Figure 1. Also reﬂected is the fact that if the optimist consumes a fraction fB
t of the
endowment at time t, his fraction of the aggregate wealth, wB
t , must be less than fB
t .
This is because the optimist consumes nothing in the valuable disaster states because
she thinks they are unlikely to occur. We can approximate this relation as follows.
First consider a claim on the aggregate endowment from now to the time of the ﬁrst
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2σ2
c(1 − γ)2 + λA.
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ρ + (γ − 1)¯ g − 1
2σ2
c(1 − γ)2 − λA(e(1−γ) ¯ d − 1)
.
(19)
When the optimist current equilibrium consumption fraction of the entire endowment
is fB
t (close to 0), his wealth fraction is then approximately fB
t VND/V . For example,
in the calibration of Section 4.1, the price-consumption ratio for the claim to the entire
endowment when fA
t = 1 is 23.98 while the price-consumption ratio of the claim to the
endowment until the ﬁrst disaster is 8.32. Using the approximation, it will be that in
the limiting case of λB = 0 we have fB/wB ≈ 23.98/8.32 = 2.88. Thus, if the optimist
has 1% of the aggregate wealth, he chooses to consume 2.88% of the endowment until
a disaster occurs, at which point he consumes nothing (approximately.)













ρ + (γ − 1)¯ g − 1
2σ2
c(1 − γ)2 +
γ−1
γ λA
ρ + (γ − 1)¯ g − 1
2σ2
c(1 − γ)2 − λA(e(1−γ)¯ d − 1)
. (20)
This numerator in the limiting expression diﬀers slightly from (18) in that it reﬂects
the fact that optimist will gain weatlh throughout time when no disaster occurs from
selling disaster insurance to the pessimist. This eﬀect will be larger when disasters
are more frequent and larger. Additionally, when (i) the eﬀect of disasters dominate
18the eﬀect of growth in the sense that λAe(1−γ)¯ d > (γ − 1)¯ g and (ii) volatility induced
convexity eﬀects are small, increasing risk aversion will increase this multiplier.
In the calibrated example, the more precise limiting expression in (20) gives a
consumption-wealth multiplier of 2.78.10 Numerically, we compute the (non-limiting
value) when λB = 0.1% as a consumption-wealth multiplier of 1.86. Combining these
eﬀects we see that the limiting derivative with respect to wealth fraction as λB ap-
proaches zero of the jump risk premium is -85.5, or -11.1 times the maximum jump
risk premium. Thus allocating 1% of the wealth to extreme optimist reduce the jump
risk premium by 11.1% of the maximum value in the limit.
We can summarize the eﬀect of the disaster risk premium on the equity premium
from the decomposition in (14). Ignoring the eﬀects on the disaster return generated
by risk sharing11, the limiting diﬀerential eﬀect of optimist on risk premia is given by
lim
λB→0+ −(e



































¯ d − 1) × λ
A. (21)
In the calibrated example, the limiting factor (with λB = 0) equals −0.581. So allo-
cating only 1% of the endowment to extreme optimist results in a decline of 58.1 basis
points in the equity premium due to this eﬀect. The value of λB = 0.1% results in a
factor of -0.19, indicating that the fact that these agents sell most, but not all, of these
claims to disaster states attenuates the eﬀect to a fair degree.12
Figure 3 compares the jump risk premium for several cases. First, the dotted line
denotes the benchmark case from Section 3.1. We also plot the jump risk premium with
the same parameters but for the limiting case where λB approaches zero. Additionally,
10The relatively small fraction of value associated with non-disaster states (1/2.78) may be surpris-
ing, given the low likelihood of the disaster. In Appendix E we show, in fact, that this is a rather
robust feature of models with alternative preferences so long as they feature a signiﬁcant disaster
component to the equity premium and a moderate wealth-consumption ratio.
11This is due to the fact that in disasters pessimist accumulate wealth (relatively) which drives
up the price-consumption ratio due to their savings motives which partially oﬀsets the decrease in
consumption associated with the disasters.
12In the more severe calibration with λA = 2.5%, the limiting factor is 294.3 resulting in an 2.94%
drop in the equity premium by introducing only 1% of extreme optimist into the economy!






















λB → 0,γ = 6
Figure 3: Limiting Jump Risk Premia. This ﬁgure plots the jump-risk premium
λ
Q
t /λA for the pessimist, where λA = 1.7%.
we plot the case where we decrease the disaster size and increase the risk aversion to
maintain the same jump risk premium for the single agent economy (γ = 5, ¯ d = 0.408).
First, we see that marginal eﬀect of adding a small amount of optimist with λB = 0.1%
are less severe than the limiting case of extreme optimism. Second, when we decrease
the size of the disaster, but increase risk aversion, the eﬀects become more severe.
This is because the risk sharing eﬀect given in (17) increase and dominate the small
reduction in consumption-wealth eﬀect given in (20).
3.3 Survival
In models with heterogeneous agents, one type of agents often dominates in the long-
run (a notable exception is Chan and Kogan (2002); see also Boroviˇ cka (2010)). Our
model also has the property that the agent with correct beliefs will dominate in the
long run. For example, let’s assume that agent A has the correct beliefs. It is easy
to verify by the strong law of large numbers that log ˜ ζt → −∞ almost surely. This
20Table 1: Survival of Agents who Disagree about the Frequency of Disasters.
This table provides the redistribution of wealth across a 50 year horizon in the model
of Section 3.1. Future relative wealth only depends on the initial wealth, the time
horizon, and the number of disasters that occur. The top panel provides the possible
wealth redistributions throughout time. The bottom panel provides the probability
(under each agent’s beliefs) for diﬀerent numbers of disasters occurring.
Final Wealth of B after Nd Disasters
Initial Wealth of B Nd = 0 Nd = 1 Nd = 2 Nd = 3
1.0% 1.2% 0.6% 0.3% 0.1%
5.0% 6.1% 3.0% 1.5% 0.7%
10.0% 12.2% 6.0% 2.9% 1.4%
50.0% 55.7% 35.5% 19.3% 9.6%
99.0% 99.2% 98.3% 96.7% 93.5%
Probability under PA 42.7% 36.3% 15.4% 4.4%
Probability under PB 95.1% 4.8% 0.1% 0.0%
implies that agent A will take over the economy with probability one. We now show
that although agents with incorrect beliefs about disasters may not have permanent
eﬀects on asset prices, their eﬀects may be long-lived in the sense that these agents can
retain, and even build, wealth over long horizons.
With disaster intensity, λt, being constant, we need only consider the distribution
of the stochastic Pareto weight, ˜ ζt, to analyze the wealth distribution over time. From
(3), we see that ˜ ζt has a stochastic component, whereby the Pareto weight (and thus
wealth) of the pessimistic agent will jump up when a disaster occurs. This is because
the pessimist receives insurance payments from the optimist in a disaster. However,
regardless of the occurrence of disasters, there is also a deterministic component in
˜ ζt, whereby the optimist has a deterministic weight increase (and thus her relative
wealth increases) which comes from collecting the disaster insurance premium. Thus,
even when the pessimist has correct beliefs, her relative wealth will decrease outside of
disasters. Since disasters are rare, it will be common to have extended periods without
disasters, during which time an optimistic agent will gain relative wealth.
21Table 1 presents a summary of the conditional distribution of wealth after 50 years
for various initial wealth distributions. We report the results under the assumption that
either the pessimist or the optimist has correct beliefs. If the number of disasters is
either 0 or 1, the wealth of the agents remain relatively close to the original distribution.
We see that the optimist is likely to retain wealth for long periods of time and will
only be wiped out with the occurrence of several disasters, which is unlikely regardless
of whose beliefs are correct.
The evolution of the wealth distribution over time also has important implications
for the equity premium and other dynamic properties of asset prices. For example,
when the initial wealth of agent B is 5% (10%), the equity premium will drop from
3.5%(2.7%) to 3.3% (2.4%) over 50 years if no disasters occurs. If after 120 years there
are still no disasters, the equity premium would further drop to 2.9% (2.0%).
The survival results presented thus far stand in sharp contrast to survival in models
of disagreement over Brownian consumption growth. As discussed in Section 2, it is
possible to raise the equity premium under the true measure if there are agents who
are pessimistic about the growth rate of consumption. For example, if the volatility of
consumption is σc = 2.0%, two types of agents have γ = 4 and ρ = 3%, one believing
(correctly) consumption growth is 2.5%, the other believing it is 0% (no disasters in
either case), then the equity premium will be roughly 2.5% when the pessimist controls
most of the wealth in the economy. However, even if the pessimist controls 99% of the
wealth initially, her wealth share will be reduced to less than 1% after 50 years with
a probability of 92.4%. Thus, even a very small amount of agents with correct beliefs
will quickly dominate the economy in the Gaussian setting.
3.4 Time-varying Disaster Risk
In the previous sections we have analyzed in depth the impact of heterogeneous beliefs
when disaster intensity is constant. Now we extend the analysis to allow the risk of
disasters and the amount of disagreements about disasters to vary over time, which
22not only makes the model more realistic, but also has important implications for the
dynamics of asset prices. As in Gabaix (2009) and Wachter (2009), time-varying dis-
aster intensity serves to drive both asset prices and expected excess returns. We now
demonstrate that within our framework, wealth distribution becomes an important
factor that drives asset price dynamics through the risk sharing mechanism. In partic-
ular, it aﬀects how sensitive the conditional risk premium will be to time variation in
disaster risk.
Our calibration of the intensity process λt in equation (2) is as follows. First,
the long-run mean intensity of disasters under the two agents’ beliefs are ¯ λA = 1.7%
and ¯ λB = 0.1%. Next, following Wachter (2009), we set the speed of mean reversion
κ = 0.142 (with a half life of 4.9 years). The volatility parameter is σλ = 0.05, so that
the Feller condition is satisﬁed.13 For simplicity, we assume that the size of disasters is
constant, ¯ d = −0.51, as in Section 3.1. The remaining preference parameters are also
the same as in the constant disaster risk case.
Figure 4 plots the conditional equity premium and the jump-risk premium under
agent A’s beliefs as functions of agent B’s wealth share wB
t and the disaster intensity
λt. First, in Panel A, holding λt ﬁxed, the equity premium drops quickly as the wealth
share of the optimistic agent rises from zero, which is consistent with the results from
the case with constant disaster risk. Moreover, this decline is particularly fast when
λt is large, suggesting that the agents engage in more risk sharing when disaster risk
is high. Indeed, the jump-risk premium in Panel B also declines faster when λt is
large, which is the result of agent A reducing her consumption loss in a disaster more
aggressively at such times.
Next, we see that the sensitivity of the equity premium to disaster intensity can be
very diﬀerent depending on the wealth distribution. The sensitivity is largest minority
wealth holders has all the wealth, but it becomes smaller as the wealth of the optimist
increases. When the optimist’s wealth share becomes suﬃciently high, the equity
13The Feller condition, 2κ¯ λA > σ2














































Figure 4: Time-varying Disaster Risk. Panel A plots the equity premium under
agent A’s beliefs as a function of agent B’s wealth share (wB
t ) and the disaster intensity
under A’s beliefs (λt). Panel B plots the jump-risk premium λ
Q
t /λt for agent A.
premium becomes essentially ﬂat as λt varies. This result has important implications
for the time series properties of the equity premium. It suggests that when λt ﬂuctuates
over time, the equity premium can either be volatile or smooth, depending on the wealth
distribution.















where now the return conditional on a disaster occurring, Et[∆R], does not depend on
the probability measure since there is a single disaster type. Variations in the wealth
distribution drive λ
Q
t /λt and Et[∆R]. Due to increased risk sharing, the jump-risk
premium declines with greater fraction of wealth controlled by the optimistic agent.
As a result, the premium becomes less sensitive to variations in λt. Moreover, we see
in Panel B of Figure 4 that the eﬀect of wealth on the jump risk premium depends on
24the disaster intensity – when the disaster intensity is high, the risk sharing motives are
very strong, resulting in larger eﬀect on the jump risk premium when the optimistic
agent controls even a small amount of wealth. Finally, the returns in disasters also
vary somewhat with the wealth distribution as the price-consumption ratio changes
after a disaster.
To further investigate the time series properties of the model, we simulate the dis-
aster intensity λt and the jump component of aggregate endowment cd
t under agent A’s
beliefs, which jointly determine the evolution of the stochastic Pareto weight ˜ ζt. Then,
along the simulated paths, we compute the equilibrium wealth fraction of agent A, wA
t ,
and the conditional equity premium under A’s beliefs, EA
t [Re]. In each simulation we
start with λ0 = 1.7% and set the initial wealth share of agent A to wA
0 = 90%. The
results from two of the simulations are reported in Figure 5.
Panel A plots the paths of λt from the simulations. The disaster intensities from
both simulations are fairly persistent, and show similar amount of variation over time.
What are not shown in this graph are the occurrences of disasters. In Simulation I,
there are no disasters. In Simulation II, disasters occur three times within the ﬁrst 50
years, around year 13, 18, and 46.
What determines the evolution of the wealth distribution? When there are no
disasters, holding λt ﬁxed, agent A is losing wealth share to B as she pays B the
premium for disaster insurance. This eﬀect is captured by the negative drift in the
Radon-Nikodym derivative ηt (see equation (3)), and is stronger when λA
t is larger. In
addition, as λt falls (rises), the value of the disaster insurance that agent A owns falls
(rises), causing her wealth to fall (rise) relative to agent B, who is short the disaster
insurance. As Panel B shows, the second eﬀect appears to be the main force driving
the wealth distribution in Simulation I.
When a disaster strikes, the wealth distribution can change dramatically. In Sim-
ulation II, the wealth share of agent A jumps up each time a disaster strikes. This is
because the disaster insurance that A (pessimist) purchases from B (optimist) pays oﬀ
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Figure 5: Simulation with Time-varying Disaster Risk. The results are from two
simulations of the model with time-varying disaster risk under agent A’s beliefs. Panel
A plots the simulated paths of disaster intensity. Panel B and C plot the corresponding
wealth share of agent A and the conditional equity premium she demands.
at such times, causing the wealth of A to increase relative to B. The size of the jump
in wA
t is bigger in the ﬁrst two disasters, which is due to two reasons. First, during the
ﬁrst two disasters, the wealth distribution is not too concentrated in the hands of agent
A, so that agent B can still provide a fair amount of risk sharing. Second, the ﬁrst dis-
aster occurs at times when λt is relatively high, i.e., they are less of a “surprise”. Thus,
agent A will have bought more insurance against the disaster beforehand, causing her
wealth share to rise more after the disaster.
Panel C shows the joint eﬀect of the disaster intensity and wealth distribution on
the equity premium. In Simulation I (no disasters), despite the fact that the optimistic
26agent never owns more than 15% of total wealth and that disaster intensity λt shows
considerable variation over the period, the equity premium is below 2% nearly 90% of
the time. This result conﬁrms our ﬁnding in Figure 4 that risk sharing between the
agents keeps the premium low and smooth when the wealth share of agent B is not too
small. In contrast, the equity premium in Simulation II shows large variation, ranging
from 0.5% to 9.2%. Besides becoming signiﬁcantly more sensitive to ﬂuctuations in
λt, the premium also changes with the wealth distribution. In particular, the premium
jumps up after each disaster. Since the wealth share of agent B drops in a disaster,
her risk sharing capacity is reduced, which drives up the equity premium. As show in
Figure 4, this eﬀect is stronger when λt is high, which is why the jump in premium is
most visible after the ﬁrst disaster (year 13).
4 General Forms of Disagreements
The aﬃne heterogeneous beliefs framework in Section 2 can capture other forms of
heterogeneous beliefs besides disagreement about disaster intensity. In this section,
we ﬁrst show that disagreement about the size of disasters has similar impact on the
risk premium as disagreement about the frequency of disasters. We then provide an
example with strong eﬀects of risk sharing even when both agents are pessimistic about
disasters. Finally, we calibrate two sets of beliefs using international and US historical
data.14
4.1 Disagreement about the Size of Disasters
For simplicity, let’s assume that the drop in aggregate consumption in a disaster follows
a binomial distribution, with the possible drops being 10% and 40%. Both agents agree
on the intensity of a disaster (λ = 1.7%). Agent A (pessimist) assigns a 99% probability
14The general form of the analysis also generalizes to the case of heterogeneous risk aversion. See
Appendix F for details.












































Figure 6: Disagreement about the size of disasters. The left panel plots the equity
premium under the pessimist’s beliefs. The right panel plots the jump-risk premium for
the pessimist. In the case with “more disagreement”, the pessimist (optimist) assigns
99% probability to the big (small) disaster, conditional on a disaster occurring. With
“less disagreement”, the probability assigned to big (small) disaster drops to 90%.
to a 40% drop in aggregate consumption, thus having essentially the same beliefs as in
the previous example. On the contrary, agent B (optimist) only assigns 1% probability
to a 40% drop, but 99% probability to a 10% drop. The rest of the parameter values
are the same as in the ﬁrst example.
Figure 6 (solid lines) plots the conditional equity premium and jump-risk premium
under the pessimist’s beliefs. When the pessimist has all the wealth, the equity pre-
mium is 4.6% (almost the same as in the ﬁrst example). Again, the equity premium
falls rapidly as we starts to shift wealth to the optimist. The premium falls by almost
half to 2.4% when the optimist owns just 5% of total wealth, and becomes 1.4% when
the optimist’s share of total wealth grows to 10%. Similarly, the jump-risk premium
falls from 7.6 to 4.5 with the optimist’s wealth share reaching 10%, which by itself will
lower the premium to 2.4%.
These results show that, in terms of asset pricing, introducing an agent who dis-
agrees about the severity of disasters is similar to having one who disagrees about the
28frequency of disasters. Even though the two agents agree on the intensity of disas-
ters in general, they actually strongly disagree about the intensity of disasters of a
speciﬁc magnitude. For example, under A’s beliefs, the intensity of a big disaster is
1.7% × 99% = 1.68%, which is 99 times the intensity of such a disaster under B’s
beliefs. The opposite is true for small disasters. Thus, B will aggressively insure A
against big disasters, while A insures B against small disasters. For agent A, the eﬀect
of the reduction in consumption loss in a big disaster dominates that of the increased
loss in a small disaster, which drives down the equity premium exponentially. Such
trading can also become speculative when B has most of the wealth: agent A will take
on so much loss in a small disaster that the jump-risk premium rises up again.
Naturally, we expect that the agents will be less aggressive in trading disaster
insurances when there is less disagreement on the size of disasters, and that the eﬀect
of risk sharing on the risk premium will become smaller. The case of “less disagreement”
in Figure 6 conﬁrms this intuition. In this case, we assume that the two agents assign
90% probability (as opposed to 99%) to one of the two disaster sizes. While the equity
premium still falls rapidly near the left boundary, the pace is slower than in the previous
case. Similarly, we see a slower decline in the jump-risk premium.
4.2 When Two Pessimists Meet
The examples we have considered so far have one common feature: the new agent we are
bringing into the economy has more optimistic beliefs about disaster risk, in the sense
that the distribution of consumption growth under her beliefs ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates that of the other’s, and that the equity premium is signiﬁcantly lower when
she owns all the wealth. However, the key to generating aggressive risk sharing is not
that the new agent demands a lower equity premium, but that she is willing to insure
the majority wealth holders against the types of disasters that they fear most.
In order to highlight this insight, we consider the following example, which combines
disagreements about disaster intensity as well as disaster size. Both agents believe









































































































Figure 7: When Two Pessimists Meet. Panel A and B plot the equity premium
and jump-risk premium under agent A’s beliefs. Panel C and D plot the individual
consumption changes in small and big disasters.
that disaster risk accounts for the majority of the equity premium. The key diﬀerence
in their beliefs is that one agent believes that disasters are rare but big, while the
other thinks disasters are more frequent but less severe. Speciﬁcally, we assume that
disasters can cause aggregate consumption drops of a 30% or 40%. Agent A believes
that λA = 1.7%, and assigns 99% probability to the bigger disaster. B believes that
λB = 4.2%, and assigns 99% probability to the smaller disaster.
By themselves, the two agents both demand high equity premium. We have chosen
λB so that, under the beliefs of agent A, the equity premium is 4.6% whether A or B
has all the wealth. However, they have signiﬁcant disagreement on the exact magnitude
of the disaster. Such disagreement generates a lot of demand for risk sharing. As we
see in Panel A of Figure 7, the conditional equity premium falls rapidly as the wealth
30share of agent B moves away from the two boundaries. In fact, the premium will be
below 2% when B owns between 9% and 99% of total wealth. In Panel B, the jump
risk premium also falls by half from 7.6 and 10 on the two boundaries when B’s wealth
share moves from 0% to 25% and from 100% to 91%, respectively.
To get more information on the risk sharing mechanism, in Panel C and D we
examine the equilibrium consumption changes for the individual agents during a small
or big disaster. Since agent A assigns a low probability to the small disaster, she
insures agent B against this type of disasters. As a result, her consumption loss in
such a disaster exceeds that of the aggregate endowment (-30%), and it increases with
the wealth share of agent B. When B has almost all the wealth in the economy, agent
A sells so much small disaster insurance to B that her own consumption can fall by as
much as 82% when such a disaster occurs. As a result, agent B is able to reduce her
risk exposure to small disasters signiﬁcantly. In fact, her consumption actually jumps
up in a small disaster when she owns less than 75% of total wealth, sometimes by over
100% (when her wealth share is small).
The opposite is true in Panel D. As agent B insures A against big disasters, she
experiences bigger consumption losses in such a disaster than the aggregate endowment
(-40%). The equilibrium consumption changes of the two agents are less extreme
compared to the case of small disasters, which is due to two reasons. First, the relative
disagreement on big disasters is smaller than on small disasters. Second, the insurance
against larger disasters is more expensive, so that agent A’s ability to purchase disaster
insurance is more constrained by her wealth.
4.3 Calibrating Disagreement: Is the US Special?
Having considered a series of special examples of heterogeneous beliefs, we now extend
the analysis to a less stylized model of beliefs on disasters. We calibrate the beliefs of
the two types of agents is as follows. Agent A believes that the US is no diﬀerent from
the rest of the world in its disaster risk exposure. Hence her beliefs are calibrated using
31cross-country consumption data. Agent B, on the other hand, believes that the US is
special. She forms her beliefs on disaster risk using only the US consumption data.
An important contribution of Barro (2006) is to provide detailed accounts of the
major consumption declines cross 35 countries in the twentieth century. Rather than
directly using the empirical distribution from Barro (2006), we estimate a truncated
Gamma distribution for the log jump size from Barro’s data using maximum likelihood
(MLE).15 Our estimation is based on the assumption that all the disasters in the sample
were independent, and that the consumption declines occurred instantly.16 We also
bound the jump size between −5% and −75%. In comparison, the smallest and largest
declines in per capital GDP in Barro’s sample are 15% and 64%, respectively. The
disaster intensity under A’s beliefs is still λA = 1.7%. The remaining parameters are:
the mean growth rate and volatility of consumption without a disaster, ¯ g = 2.5% and
σc = 2%, which are consistent with the US consumption data post WWII.
As for agent B, we assume that she agrees with the values of ¯ g and σc, but we
estimate the truncated Gamma distribution of disaster size using MLE from annual
per-capita consumption data in the US 1890-2008.17 Over the sample of 119 years, there
are three years where consumption falls by over 5%. Thus, we set λB = 3/119 = 2.5%.
Alternatively, we can also jointly estimate λB and the jump size distribution.
Panel A of Figure 8 plots the probability density functions of the log jump size
distributions for the two agents, which are very diﬀerent from each other. The solid
line is the distribution ﬁtted to the international data on disasters. The average log drop
is 0.36, which is equivalent to 30% drop in the level of consumption. In the US data,
the average drop in log consumption is only 0.075, or 7.3% in level. In addition, agent
15The truncated Gamma distribution has PDF f(d;α,β|dmin,dmax) =
f(d;α,β)/(F(dmax;α,β) − F(dmin;α,β)), where f(x;α,β) and F(x;α,β) are the PDF and
CDF of the standard Gamma distribution with shape parameter α and scale parameter β.
16These assumptions are debatable. For example, many of the major declines cross European
countries are in WWI and WWII. Moreover, many of the declines spanned several years. See Barro
and Urs´ ua (2008), Donaldson and Mehra (2008), and Constantinides (2008) for more discussions on
the measurement of historical disasters.
17The data is taken from Robert Shiller’s web site http://www.econ.yale.edu/∼shiller/data.htm




















































































Figure 8: Calibrated Disagreements: International vs US Experiences. Panel
A plots the truncated Gamma distribution of disaster size for the two agents. Panel
B plots the equilibrium consumption drops for the two agents given the size of the
disaster. Panel C and D plot the equity premium and jump-risk premium under A’s
beliefs.
A’s distribution has a much fatter left tail than B. Thus, while A assigns signiﬁcantly
higher probabilities than B to large disasters (where consumption drops by 15% or
more), agent B assigns more probabilities to small disasters, especially those ranging
from 5 to 12%. In fact, agent B’s beliefs are close to the calibration adopted by
Longstaﬀ and Piazzesi (2004), who assume that the jump in aggregate consumption
during a disaster is 10%.
The diﬀerences in beliefs lead the two agents to insure each other against the types
of disasters they fear more, and the trading can be implemented using a continuum of
disaster insurance contracts with coverage speciﬁc to the various disaster sizes. Panel
B plots drops in the equilibrium consumption (level) for the two agents when disasters
33of diﬀerent sizes occur, assuming that agent B owns 10% of total wealth. The graph
shows that through disaster insurances, agent A is able to reduce her consumption loss
in large disasters (comparing the solid line to the dotted line). For example, her own
consumption will only fall by 24% in a disaster where aggregate consumption falls by
40%, a sizable reduction especially considering the small amount of wealth that agent
B has. At the same time, she also provides insurances to B on smaller disasters, which
increases her consumption losses when such disasters strike. Agent B’s consumption
changes are close to a mirror image of agent A’s. However, the changes are magniﬁed
both for large and small disasters due to her small wealth share.
Panel C shows the by-now familiar exponential drop in the equity premium as the
wealth share of agent B increases. The equity premium is 4.4% when all the wealth is
owned by the agents who form their beliefs about disasters based on international data,
but drops to 2.0% when just 10% of total wealth is allocated to the agents who form
their beliefs using only the US data. The main reason for the lower equity premium
is again due to the decrease of the jump-risk premium (Panel D), which falls from 6.5
to 4.0 when agent B’s wealth share rises to 10%. This eﬀect alone drives the equity
premium down to 2.4%. Notice that the jump-risk premium is no longer monotonic in
the wealth share of agent B. This is because when agent A has little wealth, she would
be betting against small disasters so aggressively that the big losses for her during
small disasters can cause the jump-risk premium to rise again.
5 Time-varying Disagreement
The results in the previous section not only demonstrate the large impact that risk
sharing can have on the equity premium, but also highlight the conditions under which
disaster risk matters the most. For example, the equity premium becomes higher and
signiﬁcantly more sensitive to ﬂuctuations in disaster risk λt when the pessimistic agent
has most of the wealth. Another way to reduce risk sharing is by having the beliefs of
34the agents converge, which has been ruled out in our model. In reality, investors’ beliefs
could converge or diverge. In particular, if there is information signaling that the risk
of disasters is rising in the economy, it is possible that the optimists will update their
beliefs more than the pessimists, so that the diﬀerence in beliefs becomes smaller.
In this section, we extend the model from Section 3.1 to capture the eﬀect of
time variation in disagreement. We assume the economy can be in one of two states,
st = L,H. In state L, the two agents’ perceived disaster intensity are λA
L and λB
L,
while in state H, they become λA
H and λB
H. The transitions between the two states are







For example, the probability of the economy moving from state L to state H over
a short period ∆t will be approximately δL∆t. We assume that the agents agree on
the transition probabilities of the Markov chain. Moreover, they agree on the size of
disasters (which is constant) as well as the Brownian risk, and have the same preference
parameters as in Section 3.1.























t counts the number of disasters that have occurred up to time t while the state
is st = i.
35We solve the planner’s problem in a similar way as before. Using the results on
the occupation time of continuous-time Markov chains (see e.g., Darroch and Mor-
ris (1968)), we derive the price of aggregate consumption claim and the equity risk
premium in closed form. The details of the derivation are in Appendix G.
We ﬁrst analyze the case where beliefs converge (diverge) at times when disaster
risk rises (drops). In state L we assume the risk of disasters is low, and the amount of
disagreement between the two agents is large. The actual beliefs are λA
L = 1.7% and
λB
L = 0.1%, the same as in Section 3.1. In state H, the risk of disasters is higher, while
the relative diﬀerences in beliefs between agent A and B are smaller. Speciﬁcally, we
assume that λA
H = 2.5% and λB
H = 1.25%, so that agent A still views disasters twice as
likely as agent B does. For the Markov chain, we set δL = 0.1 and δH = 0.5, so that
the high-disaster-risk state is more transitory.
The results are quite intuitive. When there is a 10% probability of moving into a
high-disaster-risk state within a year, there is almost no eﬀect on the equity premium in
state L. When the economy is in state H, the equity premium rises, especially at times
when agent B has a nontrivial share of total wealth. For example, when the economy
moves from state L to H, the equity premium agent A demands rises from 4.7% to
7% when B has no wealth. If agent B has 20% of total wealth, the equity premium
increases from 1.7% to 5.2%. The rise in premium is in part due to higher disaster
risk, as λA rises from 1.7% to 2.5%. Another reason is that there is less disagreement




L. Hence, there is less risk sharing
between the two agents, and the pessimistic agent will have to bear bigger losses in
consumption in a disaster.
Next, we analyze the case where beliefs diverge when disaster risk rises. In this
exercise, we assume that there is no disagreement in state L, λA
L = λB
L = 1.7%. The
beliefs in state H satisfy (1 − wB)λA
H + wBλB
H = 1.7%, where wB is the wealth share
of agent B. Thus, as we increase the disagreement about disaster intensity between
the two agents in state H, the wealth-weighted average belief remains the same. We
























Figure 9: Time-varying Disagreement. Panel A plots the equity premium in the
case where beliefs converge in the state with higher disaster risk. Panel B plots the
premium as a function of the amount of disagreement for given wealth distribution.




H − 1.7%)2 + wB(λB
H − 1.7%)2.
Again, we set the transition probabilities of the Markov chain to be δL = 0.1 and
δH = 0.5.
Figure 9 shows, holding the average belief constant, the premium can fall substan-
tially as the amount of disagreement increases. As a benchmark, the dash-dotted line
gives the equity premium (under agent A’s beliefs) in state L. Since the agents have the
same beliefs in that state, the premium remains at 4.7% as the amount of disagreement
increases in state H. The solid line plots the equity premium in state H when the two
agents have equal share of total wealth. The premium falls from 4.7% to 0.9% when
λB
H drops from 1.7% to 0.1% (where the disagreement measure is 0.016). When agent
37B has just 20% of total wealth, the premium falls by a smaller amount to 2.9% (when
the disagreement measure reaches 0.008). An interesting implication of this graph is
that the premium can actually be decreasing while the average belief of disaster risk
increases, provided that there is enough increase in the amount of disagreement at the
same time.
In summary, besides the variation in disaster risk and wealth distribution across
agents with heterogeneous beliefs, time variation in the amount of disagreement across
agents can be another importance source of ﬂuctuations in disaster risk premium.
6 Concluding Remarks
We demonstrate the equilibrium eﬀects of reasonable disagreement about disasters on
risk premia and trading activities. When agents disagree about disaster risk, they will
insure each other against the types of disasters they fear most. Because of the highly
nonlinear eﬀect of disaster size on risk premia, the risk sharing provided by a small
amount of agents with heterogeneous beliefs can signiﬁcantly attenuate the eﬀect of
disasters on the equity premium. The model also has several important implications
for the dynamics of asset prices.
We should emphasize that our results do not necessarily diminish the importance
of disaster risk for the equity premium. The eﬀectiveness of risk sharing hinges on
complete markets. The amount of disaster insurance being traded in our model, while
still within the limit imposed by the budget constraint, can be diﬃcult to implement
in practice due to moral hazard. Even exchange trading and daily mark-to-market
will not eliminate the counterparty risks associated with these contracts without large
collateral constraints, because disasters will lead to sudden large changes in prices.
From this perspective, our results highlight the importance of incorporating market
incompleteness in disaster risk models. It would be very useful to study what happens
to asset prices when we limit the risk sharing among investors with heterogeneous
38beliefs about disasters, perhaps by imposing transaction costs, borrowing constraints,
and short-sales constraints18 as in Heaton and Lucas (1996).
Another possible way to reduce the eﬀects of heterogeneous beliefs is through am-
biguity aversion. As Hansen (2007) and Hansen and Sargent (2009) show, if investors
are ambiguity averse, they deal with model/parameter uncertainty by slanting their
beliefs pessimistically. In the case with disaster risk, confronting investors with the
same model uncertainty facing econometricians could lead them to behave as if they
believe the disaster probabilities are high, even though their actual priors might sug-
gest otherwise. This mechanism could reduce the heterogeneity of the distorted beliefs
among agents, thus limiting the eﬀects of risk sharing. We leave these implications to
future research.
18Since the primary risk in the aggregate endowment claim is disaster risk, shorting the stock might
serve as a close substitute to buying disaster insurance.
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A Securities’ prices and portfolio positions
In this appendix we compute the prices of the claim on aggregate endowment (stock),
the claim on individual agents’ consumption streams (agents’ personal wealth), disaster
insurance, and the equilibrium portfolio positions. We begin with the general setting of
time-varying disaster intensity. To concentrate on the eﬀects of heterogeneous beliefs,
we assume that the two agents have the same relative risk aversion γ.
A.1 Aggregate and individual consumption claim prices: gen-
eral setting

































































t+T+βi logηt+T)] = e
Ai(T)+(1−γ)cd
t +βi logηt+Bi(T)λt, (A.3)
where (Ai,Bi) satisfy a simpliﬁed version of the familiar Riccati diﬀerential equations
˙ Bi = −
¯ λB






i + (φ( 1 − γ,βi ) − 1) , B0(0) = 0, (A.4a)
˙ Ai = κθBi , Ai(0) = 0, (A.4b)
where φ is the moment generating function of jumps in  cd
t,at .
It follows that price/consumption ratio of the zero-coupon equity varies only with




T(λt, ˜ ζt). (A.5)













dT at time t is a portfolio of her































We can compute agent A’s wealth process by making a similar binomial expansion as
in the case of Pt, and then computing the expectation concerning the same aﬃne jump
diﬀusion process. Finally, the wealth process of agent B is simply P B
t = Pt − P A
t .
A.2 Special case: constant disaster risk
Closed form expressions can now be obtained in the special case of constant disaster
intensity and constant disaster size. Let’s denote ˜ ζt ≡ ζ0elog ηt. Again by expanding











































Plugging in the explicit expressions for aggregate consumption Ct, the stochastic dis-
count factor MA















(1 + (˜ ζt)1/γ)γ , (A.7a)
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where ∆a is given in (5).














k > 0 is needed to ensure ﬁnite value for Pt. We will come back to
this type of restriction below.

























(1 + (˜ ζt)1/γ)γ . (A.10)
Price of disaster insurance
Let P DI
t,t+T denotes the price of disaster insurance which pays $1 at maturity time t+T
if there was at least one disaster taking place in the time interval (t,t + T). In the
main text we consider disaster insurance P DI
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where ∆NT ≡ Nt+T−Nt is number of disasters taking place in [t,t+T], and PA(∆NT =
0) = e−¯ λT is the probability that no such disaster did happen. Again by expanding the
binomial (1 + (˜ ζt+T)1/γe(∆a∆NT−¯ λT(e∆a−1))/γ)γ, and then computing the expectation of




























γ )−1] . (A.12b)
B Equilibrium portfolio positions
In the current case of constant jump size with two dimensions of uncertainties (Brown-
ian motion and disaster jump), the market is complete when agents are allowed to trade
contingent claims on aggregate consumption (stock) Pt, money market account RFBt
and disaster insurance P DI
t . We can use generalized Ito lemma on jump-diﬀusion (see,
for example, Protter (2003)) to determine the price processes for each asset. Portfolio
positions are then determined by equating the exposures to the Brownian and jump
risks of each agents consumption claim to a portfolio of the aggregate claim and disaster
insurance, which are then ﬁnanced with the risk free bond.
C Boundedness of prices
This appendix discusses the boundedness of securities prices in general heterogeneous-
agent economy. As claimed in the main text, as long as agents have diﬀerent but
equivalent beliefs, necessary and suﬃcient condition for ﬁnite price of a security in
heterogeneous-agent economy is that this price be ﬁnite under each agent’s beliefs in












Conditions for the ﬁniteness of prices in the single agent economy can be found by
studying the ﬁxed points of the equations (A.4a). Setting dB/dt = 0, we ﬁnd the ﬁxed










provided that (13a) holds. Otherwise there is no ﬁxed point and B → ∞ implying
inﬁnite prices. Furthermore, it is easily seen that the initial condition B(0) = 0 is in
the domain of attraction. For equity price to be ﬁnite, it is easy to see that the limiting
exponent in (A.3) must be negative, or








c + κ¯ λ
iB
∗ < 0, (C.3)
43for both i = 1,2. This is (13b) after we plug in the above expression for B∗.
D Proofs from Section 3.2
In this section, we provide the proofs for (17) and (20). It is useful to rewrite expression
for the consumption fractions in terms of the initial consumption sharing rule (fA
0 ,fB
0 )


















































Additionally, for ease of notation, we set N0 = 0 and C0 = 1 which results in the
expressions being fractions of the initial endowment.



























0 = 1 and taking the limit λB → 0+, we obtain (17).
In order to compute the derivative of the wealth fraction of Agent B with respect
to fB
































































































ρ + (γ − 1)¯ g −
1
2σ2
c(1 − γ)2 +
1
γ(λB − λA) − λA(e




















ρ + (γ − 1)¯ g − 1
2σ2
c(1 − γ)2 +
γ−1
γ λA
as λB → 0
+.
Now, it is easy to see that the derivative of the value of the claim to the entire endow-
ment is bounded and since PB = 0 when fA





0 divided by the value of the claim to the entire endowment. This proves (20).
E General valuation of disaster states
In Section 3.2, we demonstrated that within a simple calibration a large fraction of the
the value of the endowment claim arises from the disaster states, even though these
states are very rare. Here we demonstrate that in fact this property is a feature of a
broad class of models. Speciﬁcally, suppose that the model is such that the dynamics of
aggregate consumption under the actual measure, as well as the risk-neutral measure,
follow the dynamics in 1 and that the risk-free rate is constant. This is true in our model
with CRRA preferences and remains true with Epstein-Zin preferences (cf. Wachter
(2009).) In particular, this reduced form setting removes the link between risk aversion
and elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Within this setting, let ¯ gQ denote the growth rate of consumption under the risk













r − ¯ gQ − .5σ2
c − λQ(e
¯ d − 1)
r − ¯ gQ − .5σ2
c + λQ
The diﬀerence between the numerator and denominator is λQe
¯ d. In order for disasters
to account for a substantial risk premium, this term should be sizeable (it is 6% in the
example of Section 3.1.) Moreover, it is reasonable to expect the price-consumption
ratio (the inverse of the denominator) should not be too small. Setting these to 4%
and 10 gives a fraction 4/14 due to disaster states. Setting them to 6% and 20 give a
fraction of 6/11 to the disaster states. In summary, under these very general reduced
form assumptions on the endowment and preferences along with the assumptions that
(i) disasters account for a signiﬁcant risk premium and (ii) the price-consumption ratio


















λA = λB = 1.7%
λA = 1.7%,λB = 1.0%
λA = 1.7%,λB = 0.1%
Figure 10: The eﬀects of heterogeneous risk aversion. This graph plots the
equity premium when the two agents have diﬀerent risk aversion: γA = 4,γB = 2.
Their beliefs about disasters are speciﬁed in the legend. Disaster size is constant.
is not too small, the fraction of wealth due to non-disaster states is signiﬁcant.19
F Heterogeneous Risk Aversion
In this section, we compare our results to models of heterogeneous preferences. Intu-
itively, besides heterogeneous beliefs, heterogeneity in risk aversion should also be able
to induce risk sharing among agents and reduce the equity premium in equilibrium.




t, which is not only sensitive to
changes in individual consumption loss ∆ci
t, but also to the relative risk aversion γi.
Thus, we expect that heterogeneous risk aversion can have similar eﬀects on the equity
premium as heterogeneous beliefs about disasters.
To check this intuition, we consider the following special case of the model. Agent
A is the same as in the example of Section 3.1: λA = 1.7%, γA = 4. Agent B has
identical beliefs about disasters but is less risk averse: λB = 1.7%, γB < γA. Figure
10 plots the equity premium as a function of agent B’s wealth share for γB = 2. The
equity premium does decline as agent B’s wealth share rises. However, the decline is
slow and closer to being linear. In order for the equity premium to fall below 2%,
19In the CRRA version of this equation, r = ρ + γ¯ g − .5σ2
cγ2 − (λQ − λP). This causes increasing
λP (and thus λQ) to increase the price-consumption ratio. In the general formula if we ﬁx r and
increase λQ independently this decreases P/C so clearly the generic form dont have EIS-risk aversion
link problems.
46the wealth share of the less risk-averse agent needs to rise to 60%. The decline in the
equity premium becomes faster as we further reduce the risk aversion of agent B (not
reported here), but the non-linearity is still less pronounced than in the cases with
heterogeneous beliefs.
Combining heterogeneous beliefs about disasters and diﬀerent risk aversion can
amplify risk sharing and accelerate the decline in the equity premium. As shown in the
ﬁgure, if agent B believes disasters are less likely than does agent A, and she happens
to be less risk averse, the equity premium falls faster. Consider the case where agent B
believes disasters only occur once every hundred years (λB = 1.0%). With 20% of total
wealth, she drives the equity premium down by almost a half to 2.5%. If λB = 0.1%,
the decline in the equity premium will be even more dramatic.
G Time-varying Disagreement
The model solution is generally analogous to the case without Markov regime-switching,
so we sketch the major diﬀerences between the models.










t is the number of disasters that occur in state i and T i
t is the occupation time
in state i deﬁned in (25). These expectations can be computed by ﬁrst conditioning on
the path of the Markov state and using the conditional independence of the Poisson

































This reduces the problem to computing the joint moment-generating function of the
occupation times (T L
t ,T H







t ] = π
′






andπ0 is either (1,0)′ or (0,1)′, as the initial state is L or H.
The price of consumption claims involve sums of integrals of such expectations.
These integral can be computed in closed form by diagonalizing A to deliver closed
form expressions for the prices of interest.
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